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Corruption in Bank Lending to Firms: 
Do Competition and Information Sharing MaUer? 
Jalnes R. Bartha, Chen Linb, Ping Linb and Frank M. Songc* 
Abstract 
Building on the important study by Beck. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine ρ00旬，
we examine the effects of borrower and lender conψetition and 粉rmation
sharing νia credit registries/bureaus on corruption in bank lending. Using the 
unique World Bank dataset 01 the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 
coνering 58 countries and i可ormation on credit registries/bureaus and bank 
regulati切1 assembled by other scholars, we find (1) strong evidence that banking 
competition reduces lending corruption and (2) the first and robust evidence that 
l可ormation sharing among banks (especially via private bureaus) contribufes to 
reducù穹的-ruption in bank lending. We also find that government- and foreign-
owned firms as well as 以porting firms tend to be subject to less lending 
corruption, objective courts and better law enforcement tend to reduce lending 
corruption， 的d private and fore但n owneJ叫ip 01 the banking industηJ are 
associated with more integrity in lending. These fin叫叫叫1d泊ings p αωss α numη1ber 01 f 
robuω4βst仰ne臼ss t仿est白S α nd t的h句砂J αωre consi臼sf倌e臼仰n叫1t w川it的h t的hep戶r沼叫edic切圳Cαωωf幻μi仰O
mη10del. 
1. Introduction 
Banks matter for countries at all stages of development and in all pa此s of the 
world. Banking systems that operate efficiently facilitate the channeling and 
monitoring of savings to the most productive investment projects and thereby 
enhance the perfonnance of economies. Since bank lending is a major source of 
extemal finance for business finns , especially in developing and emerging market 
'a) Department of Finance, Auburn University and Milken lnstitute, USA , i.Qarth {@， milkeninstitute.or皂，
b) Department of Economics, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, fhen.1 inlâlln .edu .hk, and 
D1 in(a) ln.edu.hk; and c) School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong, 
fmson皂白lecon .hku.hk
We thank Paul Evans, Edward Green, Belton Fleisher, Wing Suen, Yijiang Wang, Colin Xu, Ruilin 
Zhou, and participants in the 4U1 Summer Workshop on Industrial Organization and Management 
Strategy at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics and the economics and finance workshop 
at The University of Hong Kong for helpful comments and suggestions 
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economies, a we l1-functioning banking system can also help reduce income 
inequality and poverty. Indeed, recent research suggests that banks exert a first-
order impact on economic development (e.g. , Levine, 1997 and 2005). 
Unfo此unately， banking systems do not always operate efficiently in countries. 
In particul缸， they are susceptible to corruption, which underrnines their primary 
function of allocating scarce capital efficiently. This is a particularly serious 
problem in developing and transition countries to the extent that they lack 
adequate laws, objective courts, prude叫al rεgulations ， and other appropriate 
institutions to sufficiently contain corruption. In this regard, China, among other 
countries, has been moving aggressively to address the corruption problem. For 
example, 461 cases of bank fraud involving more than one million yuan 
(US$125 ,000) each were uncovered in China in 2005. These cases alone amounted 
to 7.7 billion yuan in fraudulent activity.l As another example, in 2000, Turkey's 
banking sector suffered losses of some $12 billion (about 6% of GDP). Some of 
the worst performing banks had been run by some of Turkey's top business and 
political figures. The banking crisis prompted an anti-corruption drive.2 These and 
other examples of bank corruption in countries everywhere are quite costly 
because when bank managers take deposits and then pass them along to businesses 
not solely based on efficiency considerations, fewer funds are available to support 
more worthy business initiatives. The poor and unconnected individuals with 
innovative ideas are alsô denied funds to realize their dreams and improve their 
economic condition (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2006). 
Despite its importance, there are surprisingly few studies, either theoretical or 
empirical, of the determinants of corruption in obtaining bank loans by firms. 
lndeed, the only one of which we are aware of is by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (2006, BDL hereafter). In an empirical study, they rely on the answer to a 
survey question in the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) -“Is the 
corruption of bank officials an obstacle for the operation and growth of your 
business?刊- to measure the degree of corruption in bank lending. BDL then 
examine the relationship between bank supervisory power and lending corruption 
and find that strengthening traditional official supervision does not have a positive 
1m 
I Yahoo! News Asia, Nov. 1, 2006. 
2 HighBeam Research, www.highbeam .com/doc. 
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The BDL study is important because it overcomes the difficulty of measuring 
the degree of bank corruption by resorting to a firm-based survey question on the 
obstacles for operating and growing a firm due to bank-lending corruption. It also 
has significant policy implications insofar as it finds that the conventional official 
regulatory framework that relies on empowering official supervisory agencies to 
directly monitor, control, and discipline banks does not improve the integrity of 
bank lending. Rather, BDL find that empowering private monitoring of banks 
works best to promote integrity in bank lending. 
Our paper is motivated by the pioneering work of BDL. We follow their lead 
and measure lending corruption by using the same survey responses of firms 
regarding the obstacles in obtaining bank loans due to co叮upt bankers. 3 
1mportantly, however, we extend their study to examine whether bank competition 
and information sharing help to curtail co汀uption in bank lending. To set the stage 
for our empirical work, we develop a bargaining model of a firm and ba心r to 
highlight the determinants of lending corruption. More specifically, a Nash 
bargaining model is developed in which the finn and the banker negotiate the 
terms of a bank loan. Bribery is then introduced to allow a finn to obtain a bank 
]oan at a ]ower rate than otherwise. Factors that strengthen the bargaining power of 
the firm manager vs. the banker, however, are shown to help reduce the likelihood 
and the amount of bank bribery. We now briefly describe the predictions provided 
by our mode l. 
First, our model predicts that greater competition among banks, by enhancing 
the bargaining power of the firm over . that of the banker, reduces lending 
co叮uption. 1n contrast, increased competition among firms could increase lending 
corruption since greater competitive pressure in their market could force a firm 
manager to be more aggressive in seeking a bank loan. 1n our model, this 
pa口icular situation implies lower bargaining power of the finn manager and thus a 
greater resort to bribery in bank lending. A possible additional effect of increased 
firm competition, however, is a higher default risk, which in our model implies a 
higher “ fair interest rate". Since the firm manager bribes the banker in exchange 
for a lower interest rate than the risk-adjusted or “fair interest rate'\the higher the 
latter rate, the larger the gap between it and the discretionary loan rat 
o According to BDL, although the measure of lending corruption is based on the managers' subjective 
view of financing obstacles when dealing with banks, any potential resulting biases do not affect the 
results in any particular direction. In fact, to the extent that those measurement error problems are not 
systematically related to country characteristics, this may be Iess of a concern when studying variations 
in corruption across countries. See section 3 of our paper for greater detaiI on this point 
Second, it is well known that banks are exposed to problems of infonnation 
asymmetry , in which lenders and borrowers possess different information about 
the risk of defaul t. Pagano and Jappelli (1993) in this regard point out that 
infonnation sharing among lenders, through institutions such as credit bureaus, 
augments the due diligence process, by providing infonnation about borrowers' 
characteristics and credit histories. This helps to mitigate the problem of adverse 
selection, in which borrowers whose credit worthiness is not easily discernable by 
lenders may accept less atlractive loan terms because they are also the ones most 
likely to defaul t. It can also be beneficial in addressing the moral hazard problem 
in which a borrower may not take sufficient precautions to avoid default after 
obtaining a loan, through its positive incentive effects on borrowers who desire 
access to credit in the future (Padilla and Pagano, 1997 and 1999). In our model, 
we study the effect of infonnation sharing on lending corruption and find that it 
helps decrease bank-lending corruption, by reducing the degree of discretion that 
can be exercised in evaluating loan applicants due to imperfect infonnation. 
Additional predictions from our model suggest that state or foreign ownership 
of a finn lowers lending corruption , by lowering the default risk and enhancing the 
bargaining power of the finn. In the case of banks, foreign or private ownership 
helps reduce lending corruption because of greater concern about an adverse 
reputational effect, better managerial incentives and /or negative externalities on 
their operations in other countries. 
In the empirical part of the paper, we test the predictions of our bargaining 
model by combining infonnation 企om three databases. First, as mentioned above, 
we follow BDL in measuring lending corruption by using the same survey 
question noted above from the WBES. Second, we rely on Barth, Capiro, ànd 
Levine (2006, BCL herea缸er) to measure various dimensions of bank regulation 
across different countries. BCL present and discuss a new database on bank 
regulation in 152 countries during 2001-2003. In particular, it includes detailed 
measures of bank entry regulations, capital requirements, supervisory powers, 
explicit deposit insurance schemes, private monitoring，叮/pe of bank ownership, 
among other regulatory variables. Third, we obtain measures of infonnation 
sh 
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theo巾， both banking competition and infonnation sharing are important 
determinants of bank lending corruption. 
We obtain two main empirical results. First, as predicted by our theory, greater 
competition in banking helps to curtaiI co叮uption in lending. However, as in BDL 
(2006), increased competition among finns does not significantly reduce lending 
co汀uption. Second, information sharing, by making infonnation more timely and 
accurate though credit registries, helps reduce corruption in bank lending. 
However, we find that only private bureaus have a significant effect in reducing 
lending corruption, whereas public registries do not appear to have asignificant 
effect. We bel ieve that this has to do with the fact that private bureaus- generally 
contain finer infonnation about borrowers than do public registries. 1n particular, 
the infonnation available from public credit registries consists mainly of credit 
data above a certain threshold (minimum loan size) and is disseminated in 
consolidated fonn (no detaiIs on individual Ioans). The private credit bureaus, in 
contrast, offer details on individual loans and merge the credit infonnation with 
data from other sources (e.g. , courts, tax authorities, and financial statements).4 
Beyond the above two major findings , we obtain several additional results: (1) 
govemment- and foreign-owned firms tend to be subject to less lending corruption. 
Our explanation for this finding is that these government-/foreign-owned firms 
tend to have more bargaining power in negotiations for loans with banks and they 
could also be subject to lower defau \t risk. (2) Exporting finns tend to be subject 
to Iess lending corruption. This is because they may aIso haveεreater access to 
extemal finance and hence more bargaining power in negotiations for loans with 
banks. (3) Objective courts and better law enforcement tend to reduce lending 
corruption. This is expected since lending corruption is generally related to other 
illegal activities and the expropriation of creditors' rights so that a we l1-
functioning legal environment helps to reduce these practices. (4) Private and 
foreign ownership of the banking industry are associated with more integrity in 
lending. 
We perfonn a number of robustness tests on our results. Specifically, we 
expand our control variables by including major macro-economic and institutional 
measures. We also examine the poten 
4 See section 3.4 for more discussion on the differences between private bureaus and public registries 
typically study cross-count句， macro measures of public corruption.5 For example, 
Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995) use indicators of corruption 
assembled by private risk-assessment firms (e.g. , t伽h忱1旭e 1扣η叫f的e臼r川川-11叩叫叫正GIυ的t幻io仰O
Gzωiμide吋).0 Others rely on perception-based measures like the Corruption Perception 
lndex by Transparency Intemationa l. Few studies rely on m icro- and firm-based 
measures of corruption. Some exceptions are Svensson (2003), Fisman and 
S丸'ensson (2001), and Clark and Xu (2004). The first two studies use finn叫rvey
data from Uganda to study the magnitude of corruption and its impact on firm 
perfonnance. More specifically, Svensson (2003) provides evidence that the 
amount of a bribe a finn needs to pay is negatively correlated with the degree of 
reversibility of a capital stock investment. Fisman and Svensson (2001) find that 
bribery is negatively co叮elated with finn growth. Clarke and Xu (2004) use 
enterprise-level data in 21 transition economies to examine how characteristics of 
the public utilities taking bribes and the finns paying bribes affect corruption in 
the sector. In this paper, we follow these more recent studies insofar as relying on 
micro-based measures of corruption in the fonn of finn survey data to study bank-
lending corruption. 
A controversial issue in the corruption literature is whether increased 
competition can reduce corruption. Some argue that greater firm competition could 
lead to less corruption because firms' profits are driven down by the heightened 
competitive pressure to the point at which there are no excess profits from which 
to pay bribes (Ades and Di Tella, 1999). Others, such as a study by Bliss and Di 
Tella (1997), argue that the level of graft demanded per finn depends on the 
likelihood that finns in the market are more or less likely to exit due to a marginal 
increase in graft demand, not on the number of firms in the market or the degree of 
“natural" competition. As regards competition among briber takers, Rose-
Ackennan (1978) argues that increased competition (among the officials receiving 
the potential bribes) reduces co訂uption. Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1 993) 
argue that when officials dispense govemment-produced goods, such as passports~ 
the existence of a competing official in which to reapply to when asked for a bribe 
5 A common definition of public corruption is the misuse of public oftìce for private gain, such as the 
sale of government property by govemment offtcials、 kickbacks in public procurement, or bribery and 
embezzlement of govemment funds (Svensson , 2005) . However, corruption can also take the form of 
collusion between fìrms or misuse of corporate assets that imposes costs on customers and investors 
(private sector corruption) 
6 The lnlernafional Countly Risk Guide corruption indicator captures the likelihood that high 
government offìcials will demand special payments and the extent to which illegal payments are 
expected through government tiers. 
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will bid down the equilibrium amount of corruption. However, there is lack of 
convincing empirical evidence supporting this argument about the benefit of 
greater competition (Svensson, 2005). 1n this paper, we provide such evidence in 
the case of bank Iending. FinaIly, in the corruption literature, there is no discussion 
about the role of information sharing in reducing corruption. We provide the first 
evidence indicating that infonnation sharing helps to aIleviate the impacts of 
asymmetric information on bribery in the bargaining process for Ioans between 
firms and banks. 
We aIso contribute to the bank competition literature. Berger et al. (2004) 
survey an extant literature on the effect of bank competition on the perfonnance of 
banks (e.g. , bank efficiency, bank net interest margins (profits), and bank risk-
taking), firms' access to extemaI financing, and tìnancial stability. However, the 
surveyed literature seems to provide no cIear answer to the question as to whether 
bank competition is “good" or “bad" from a social perspective (e.g., AIIen et a1. 
2001). Our paper indicates that one positive and important aspect of bank 
competition is in reducing corruption, apart from any impacts on bank efficiency 
and stability. 
In the information-sharin2: literature. it is well known that in bankinσthere are :;:, ...-. ~'~'-， 
substantial infonnation-asymmetry problems. The information wedge between 
lenders and borrowers may prevent the efficient allocation of Iending, Ieading to 
credit rationing (e.g. , Jaffee and RusseII , 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) or to a 
wedge between lending and borrowing rates (e.g., King 1986). Infonnation 
sharing among lenders, by augmenting the due diligence process, helps to mitigate 
the problem of adverse selection (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993). It can also be 
valuable in addressing moral hazard problems through its incentive effects on 
curtailing imprudent borrower behavior (Padilla and Pagano, 1997 and 2000). In 
this way, information sharing contributes positively to the functioning of credit 
markets (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). 
However, few empirical studies have examined the effect of information 
sharing on bank lending and default risk. One study by Jappe lI i and Pagano (2002) 
finds that bank lending is higher and credit risk is lower in countries where lenders 
share infonnation, regardless of the private or public nature of the infonnation-
sharing mechanism 
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failure prediction models after controlling for other credit infonnation that is easily 
available to lenders. Our paper suggests that more 'timely and accurate information 
about a borrowing firm is likely to be conducive in reducing corruption in bank 
lending, with empirical support provided based on firrn-Ievel survey data. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a Nash 
bargaining model for negotiating a loan between a firm manager and a bank loan 
officer. The model generates several important predictions conceming the 
relationship between competition, information sharing and corruption in bank 
lending. Section 3 describes our data and provides variable definitions used in the 
empirical work. Section 4 presents and discusses our empirical results. Section 5 
presents some robustness tests of our major results. Section 6 conc1 udes the paper 
with a discussion of some policy implications of the results. 
2. Model 
2 , 1 A Nash Bargaining Model of Bank Lending Corruption 
In this section, we construct a simple Nash bargaining model between a firrn 
and a bank to highlight the process and detenllinants of bank-Iending corruption. 
The firm desires to secure one unit of a loan for an investment project. The bank 
has to decide whether to provide the loan to the firrn and, if it does, what interest 
rate to charge. Once the loan application of the finll is submitted, the ba叫(er (a 
loan officer) will examine the creditworthiness ofthe borrower and decide upon an 
interest rate to charge the loan applicant. 
Let R denote the “ fair interest rate" the firm should pay. lt reflects the firrn' s 
default risk, given the level of competition among banks in supplying loans. The 
greater the firm's default risk, the higher wi I1 be R. The fair interest rate also 
depends on the market power the bank possesses in supplying loans. The more 
competition in the banking sector, the lower wiII be R. Similarly, R also depends 
on the degree of competition the firrn faces in its product market. The more 
competition among firms , the lower a finll 's retum from an investment project, 
and hence the lower its ability wiU be to pay back a loan.7 
Let 1 denote the amount (or the set) of infonnation available to a bank when 
examining the loan application. 1 contains aIl the relevant information a bank can 
assess regarding a firm's proposed investment project, corporate govemance, 
financial strength , and credit historγ . An important source of this type of 
7 The outcome ofthe firm ' s project to be financed by the bank loan may be uncertain , Our focus here is 
on the poss ibility ofbribery between the firm and the loan officer, so we simply use R to capture all the 
underlying uncertainty that may be associated with the firm ' s investment project 
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infomlation about the borrower that may be available is credit registries or credit 
bureaus. When infonnation-sharing facilities like these are available, a bank is 
able to obtain more information about a firm so as to determine the level of default 
risk and thereby '^收ther to lend money a叫， if so, the interest rate to charge. We 
can express this relationship as foIIows: 
R = R(f , Comp j' ComPh) , 
where ComPI stands for the degree of competition the finn faces in its product 
market and Compb the degree of competition in the banking sector. (Of course, 
other factors also affect the level of default risk of the finn as wiII be discussed 
below.) 
Given the level of banking competition and the infonnation set 1, and hence R, 
the bank may offer a lower rate, R - ~， or r, to the finn , in exchange for a bribe, B , 
B 三~. If the two parties can strike a deal, then the finn receives the loan at a lower 
interest rate than otherwise, and the loan officer takes the bribe. If they fail to 
strike a deal , then the finn receives the loan at the rate R, and the loan officer gets 
nothing extra personally from the transaction. Therefore , the disagreement point of 
the finn is dj = π- R and the disagreement point of the loan officer is d b = 0, 
whereπis the net profit of the finn from its investment project. 
One can think of R - ~ as an acceptable rate of interest to the bank, given that 
infonnation about a borrower is in general imperfect (or asymmetric). The idea is 
that absent perfect infonnation about the loan applicant, there is always some level 
of discretion that must be used in setting the loan rate, even by an uncorrupted 
loan officer. lt is useful here to not consider ~ as a decision variable in the bribery 
dea l. Rather, R - ~， or r can be regarded as the lowest . interest rate that would be 
acceptable to the bank, given the information set 1 and the fair rate R.8 
Of course, the extent of such discretion (or ambiguity as to whether the 
interest rate reflects bribery or not) that exists or may be exercised depends on the 
amount of infonnation available to the bank prior to granting the loan, among 
other things. Thus, ~ is a function of 1. But it may also depend on the degree of 
competition on both the lender and the borrower sides, thus 
~ = ~(f， Comp f 、 ComPh) . 
Bribery, of course, may be detected and thus punished by the bank manager 
and/or regulator, in which case the loan officer wi l1 be penalized (e.g. , demoted, 
fined and/or even face more stringent legal sanctions). Let p denot 
8 In fact , even when ~ is a decision variable it will then be in the best interest of the barga ining parties 
to choose R - ~ ， or r, to be the lowest acceptable level , so as to maximize the amount that can be 
shared between them in the bribery bargaining game. 
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of detecting bribery and C h the amount of pena)ty imposed on a loan officer. 1n 
addition to 丸， the bribe wiII be confiscated by the bank. Thus, the expected payoff 
to a loan officer iS (1 -p)B-pc" . We also assume that if the bribery is discovered, 
then the rate of interest owed on the )oan amount will be adjusted upwards to the 
fair rate R for the firm (gross of the bribe amount). Hence , the expected payoff of 
the finn is 
(1- p)(方 -R+ f:. -B)+p(π -R).
The generalized Nash bargaining problem is thus given by:9 
Maximize [((1- p)(π - R+ f:.- B)+ p(π 一的一 d/ W-α x [(卜 p)B - PCh - d ,, ]a , 
with respect to B , and whereαmeasures the bargaining power of the bank loan 
officer, and 1 一 αthat of the firm. 
Taking the logarithm of the objective function and solving the first-order 
condition provides the equilibrium amount of bribery to the bank loan officer 
under the Nash bargaining solution: 
B﹒ =α x f:.+~一(1 -α)Ch1- p 
The solution has an intuitive interpretation: in the bribery bargaining situation, the 
loan officer receives a share of the net gain f:. of the deal in proportion to his/her 
bargaining power, plus the risk-premium of getting caught for bribery.'o 
2.2 Predictions ofthe Bargaining Model 
Competition in the banking sector lowers the bargaiñi i1g power of the bank 
(loan officer) ， α ， leading to a decl ine in B *. (While increased competition also 
lowers the rate on a loan, R, it is not clear how it may affect the extent of 
directional change in granting the loan, 6.). Increased competition on the firm side 
increases default risk and hence lowers the bargaining power of the fiml (soαwill 
increase), resulting in greater bank lending corruption, B * . 
月;pothes is 1: 
• Competition in the banking sector reduces bank lending corruption by 
lowering the loan officer's bargaining power (α). 
9 The existing theoretical literature on corruption has focused on bribery between a government offìci刻，
(e.g., a regulator) and a fìrm applying for a license. Bargaining models in the literature thus postulate 
that the government official has full barga ining power (Bliss and Di Tella, 1997 and Ades and Di Tel 峙，
1999). 1n our model , because there is competition on both th巴 bribery taker and bribery giver sides, we 
use a generalized Nash bargaining framework . 
10 We assume that Cb 三匕J!..6. so that B* is within the fe的ble range, i.e., B' $ 6. p 
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• Competition on the finn side increases corruption by raising the default risk 
of the loan and lowering the finn's bargaining power (卜的.
Now consider the effects of infonnation sharing on bank-lending C01γuption. 
More information sharing among lenders about loan applicants increases 
infonnation accuracy and timeliness, thus leading to less discretion or ambiguity 
in interest rate setting (i.e. , ð. becomes smaller as the amount of infonnation 
increases). Thus, B* declines with infonnation sharing. 
月)pothesis 2: 
. 1nfonnation sharing among lenders (via credit registries or credit bureaus) 
helps reduce bank-lending corruption, by limiting the discretion/ambiguity 
that exists in evaluating loan applicants due to imperfect infonnation. 
The type of ownership on both the borrower and lender sides can also affect 
the level of bank-lending corruption. State ownership of the finn (borrower), for 
example, may increase the bargaining power of the finn in dealing with banks, 
thereby lowering B大 AIso， due to the presence of a “ soft-budget constraint" and 
hence a higher probability of repaying a bank loan, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
may be safer borrowers relative to other finns. Furthennore, SOEs sometimes can 
obtain bank loans due to govemment policy so there is less of a need to bribe bank 
officers. 1n the care of foreign-owned finns , they may have altemative channels 
for obtaining funding for their investments (e.g. , from their parent companies). 
Altemative戶 to bank loans in tum implies greater bargaining power and hence a 
lower B * in .our mode l. 
On the lende凹， side, it is not that clear what fonn of ownership facilitates 
combating bank-Iending corruption. It can be argued that foreign banks or private 
banks may care more about their c。中orate reputation and thus exert greater effort 
in preventing bribe taking by their loan officers, relative to state-owned banks. 
Furthennore, private and foreign ownership may strengthen managerial incentives 
to monitor potential corruptive behavior of employees, thus reducing bribes. 
Moreover, bank corruption once detected has wider negative extemalities among 
branches of multinational banks operating in different countries, which gives 
foreign banks an extra incentive to fight lending corruption. 
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月少othesis 3 
• State ownership of borrowing firms tends to reduce bank-lending corruption 
(not necessarily because of a better quality of investment, but because of a 
“soft- budget constraint刊) .
• Foreign ownership of borrowing finns may help decrease bank-lending 
corruption because it may give the borrower greater bargaining power. 
• Foreign or private ownership of banks helps reduce lending corruption 
because of the reputational effect, better managerial incentives and negative 
extemalities on their operations in other countries. 
The above hypothesis leads to the following observation. ln the bargaining 
solution, the equilibrium level of bribery B* increases with the probability of 
getting caught, p. This can be understood as follows. As p increases, the loan 
officer demands greater compensation from the finn due to the heightened risk of 
detection. Yet, the overall expected utility of the corrupted loan officer decreases 
with p. ln fact, the expected value of corruption, -
(l -p) B. - PCb = (1- p)αð. - PCb 
decreases with increases in both p and C h . Thus, improved bank management or 
govemment regulation, by making detection of bribery a priority and raising the 
penalty on corrupted bank officials when being caught, reduces corruption on the 
whole, but increases the amount of bribes taken by those bank officers who 
continue such behavior. 
3. Data and Variables 
3.1 The Sample 
The dataset used in this study is compiled from three main sources: (1) the 
World Business Environment Survey (WBES) on corruption in 80 countries, (2) 
the BCL (2006) dataset on bank supervision and regulation in 152 countries, (3) 
and the DMS (2007) dataset on infonnation sharing in 129 countries. Most finn-
level data used in the study come from the WBES , which was conducted in 2000 
by a team from the World Bank. Managers from over 9,000 finns in more than 80 
countries were surveyed with a standard questionnaire. The main pu巾。se was to 
identify the driving factors behind and obstacles to enterprise perfonnance and 
growth in countries around the world. The questionnaire covered many aspects of 
a finn' s operations, including questions on corruption, regulation, and institutional 
environment. BDL (2006) note three advantages in using the WBES data in 
studying bank corruption. First, it provides direct information on the degree to 
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which corruption in lending represents an obstacle to finns. Second, the finns 
surveyed vary in size, ownership (both public and private), industrial sector, and 
organizational structure. 1n particular, the dataset covers a large proportion of 
small- and medium-size enterprises, whereas most other cross-country studies 
focus exclusively on large, listed finns. Third, the finn-Ievel survey data a l10w us 
to control for firm-specific characteristics and hence to draw appropriate 
inferences about the relationships between competition, infonnation sharing and 
bank corruption. 
The banking competition and ownership data come from BCL (2006), which 
were compiled based on a World Bank survey on bank regulation and supervision 
in 152 countries durinσ2001-2003. The information-sharing variables come from 。-
DMS (2007), who collect data on private and public credit institutions in 129 
countries during 1978-2003. Because of the incomplete overlap among the three 
datasets and missing firm-level and banking-sector variables, the final sample used 
in our study includes 4,395 enterprises in 58 countries all over the world. 11 
1n addition to the three datasets mentioned above, we rely on three other data 
sources , the World Development 1ndicator (WD1, 2004) , the World Govemance 
lndicator compiled by Kaufmann et a1. (2006), and Triesman (2000), to control for 
macro- institutional factors that might affect the overalllevel of bank corruption in 
a country. Tables 1 and 2 identify the data sources and provide brief descriptions 
and summary statistics ofthe key variables. 
[Tables 1 and 2 here] 
3.2. Bank Corruption 
The bank corruption measure is the dependent variable in our analysis. 
Following BDL (2006), we construct the measure of corruption (Corruption) 
using data from WBES. Specifically, it is based on the key question conceming 
bank corruption in the survey. The question takes the following fonn: “Is 
comlption of bank officials an obstacle for the operation and growth of your 
business"? Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle), 2 (a minor obstacle), 3 (a 
moderate obstacle), and 4 (a major obstacle). Thus, a higher value indicates more 
severe and pervasive corruption in lending. Thus, the WBES data provide direct 
infonnation for finns about the degree of specific, perceived obstacles. 
11 The countries include Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan、 Belarus ， Boli via, Bosnia, Botswana, 
Brazil , Bulgaria, Canada、 Chile， Colombia, Costa Rica、 Cote d' Ivoire, Croatia‘ Czech Rep、 Ecuador，
Egypt, E1 Salvador, Eston悶， Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Hunga門， India, Italy, 
Kazakhstan , Kenya, Kyrgizstan , Lithuania, Malays悶， Mexico, Moldova, Pakistan , Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal , Roman泊， Russia, Senega1, Slovakia, Sloven悶， South Africa, Spain, 
Thailand, Trinidad&Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, UK雪 US ， Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe 
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As po inted out by BDL (2006), there are good reasons for believ ing that these 
se lf-reported data are not biasing the resu 1ts in fa vor of their or our findings . BDL 
(2006) prov ide a detailed explanation and justification of this point (pp. , 2 136-
2137). As argued in BDL, if a finn facing the same obstacles responds to 
questions di fferent1y in different instituti ona1 environments, then, to the extent that 
this represents pure measurement e叮or， it would bias the resu1ts 且早型旦旦 finding a 
significant re1ationship between competitiol月 ， information sharing and finn 
financing obstac1es. A1so, as in BDL, we obtain the sallle results when controlling 
for many country-specific traits. Finally, additional work done or cited in BDL 
show that firms' responses to the survey on financing obstacles are capturing more 
than idiosyncratic differences in how firms rank obstacles; the survey data are 
associated with measurable outcomes in tenns of efficiency of investment fl ows, 
firm growth, institutions, corruption and property ri ghts ,. in several recent and 
influential studies (e.g. , Hellman et a1., 2000; Djankov et a l., 2003; Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maskimovic, 2005; Acemoglu and 10hnson, 2005; Ayyagari 
et a l. , 2007). Beck, Demirg uc-Kunt and Peria (2007) show an objective measure of 
access to and use of banking services across countries is closely related to the 
WBES measure of firm financing obstac1 es. 
3.3. Competition 
A key independent variable in our study is a measure of banking competition. 
A widely used measure in this regard is the concentration ratio (e .g., Demirguc-
Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004). We therefore use the share of the fì ve largest 
banks in total bank deposits (Banking Concentration (Deposit)) from BCL (2006) 
to measure banking concentration. Higher concentration indicates less 
cOlllpetitiveness within the banking industry. As a check on thè robustness of the 
results, we use the share of total assets held by the fi ve largest banks in the 
industry (Banking Concentration (Asse t)) as an altemative concentration measure 
in our ana1ysis. As will be seen, both measures yield verγsimilar and consistent 
results. 
111 their survey paper of banking concentrati on and competition, Berger et a1. 
(2004) point out that bank competition is multifaceted insofar as it encolllpasses 
not only bank concentration but a1so regulatory restrictions, such as entry 
restrictions and other legal impediments t 
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intended organization chart, financial projections for the first three years, financial 
information on the main potential shareholders, the background of future directors 
and managers, sources of funds to be disbursed in the capitalization of the new 
bank and market differentiation intended for the new bank) are required to obtain a 
banking license. The index ranges from 0 (low entry requirement) to 8 (high entrγ 
requirement), with higher values indicating greater stringency. The second 
variable is the fraction of entry applications denied (Application Denied), which is 
the percentage of applications to enter banking that have been denied in the past 
five years. This variable varies significantly across countries. At one extreme, the 
ratio is above 85% in countries like Egypt, Kenya and Pakistan. At the other 
extreme, the ratio is below 50/0 in countries like France, Sweden and the United 
States. All these data are from BCL (2006). 
3.4 . 1可ormation-Sharing
Another key independent variable in our analysis is information sharing. It is 
argued that infonnation sharing among lenders, by augmenting the due diligence 
process, helps to reduce the information gap and thereby mitigates the problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993). ln our model, 
infonnation sharing among lenders (via credit registries or credit bureaus) helps in 
lowering bank- lending corruption, by reducing the discretion that may be 
exercised in evaluating loan applicants due to imperfect infonnation. Following 
DMS (2007), we include two dummy variables to measure infonnation sharing 
among lenders. The first indicates whether a public credit registry (Public Credit 
Registry ) exists, which equals one if a public credit registry is operating in the 
country by the end of 1999, and zero otherwise. A public registry is defined as a 
database owned by a public authority, usually the central bank or banking 
supervisory authority, which collects infonnation on the credit worthiness of 
borrowers and makes it available to financial institutions (DMS , 2007). ln 2000, 
public registries operated in 35 countries in our sample. The second measure 
indicates whether a private credit bureau (Priνate Credit Bureau) exists, which 
equals one if a private credit bureau is operating in the country by the end of 1999, 
and zero otherwise. A private bureau is defined as a private commercial finn that 
maintains a database 
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contractual, but imposed by regulation. For this reason, public credit registries 
usually have larger coverage than that of private bureaus (Jappelli and Pagano, 
2002). However, a public credit registry also has some limitations. It is quite 
common for public credit registries to set a minimum loan size and therefore to 
collect infonnation only on loans in excess of this amount (Miller, 2003). 
Furthermore, the infonnation from public credit registries consists mainly of credit 
data and is disseminated in consolidated fonn (so that details about individual 
loans are not available). 12 1n contrast, private credit bureaus offer details on 
individual loans and merge credit data with data from other data sources (e.g. , 
courts, tax authorities and tìnancial statements), though they are less 
comprehensive in coverage (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). Due to these differences, 
it is quite interesting to explore whether public credit registries and private bureaus 
have different impacts on corruption in bank lending. 
We also include a dummy variable (Firm Auditing) to measure the 
completeness and accuracy of the financial statements disclosed by tìnns. This 
variable equals one if a tìnn provides its shareholders with annual tìnancial 
statements that have been reviewed by an extemal auditor, and zero otherwise. A 
higher value indicates more complete and accurate infonnation disclosure of a 
finn. Better finn tìnancial discIosure should improve the quality of infonnation 
sharing and hence reduce the infonnation gap between banks and tìrms. Th is, in 
tum, should reduce corruption. 
Furthermore, we include the number ofyears since the establishment ofpublic 
credit registries and private bureaus to measure the amount of infonnation sharing. 
Public RegistlY Age is the number of years since the starting or establishment date 
ofthe public registry. Private Bureau Age is the number ofyears since the starting 
or establishment date of the oldest private credit bureau in the countrγ. Public 
credit registriesl private bureaus that have been around longer should contain 
longer credit histories of finns and thus contain more infonnation for sharing. 
However, as Miller (2003) points out, the public registry data function as a kind of 
enforcement devise in many countries; with the data on defaults or late payments 
erased once loans have been paid. 1n addition, many countries only distribute 
current data (e.g 
12 Due to confìdentiality concems, the total credit exposure for a borrower is 0庇en aggregated, and the 
names ofthe lending institutions are omitted , before the information is distributed (Miller 2003) 
16 
infonnation. Nevertheless, this is an empirical issue that we wiII explore in the 
next sect lOn. 
3.5. Bank Ownership 
As discussed in the theory section, private and foreign ownership in the 
banking sector may reduce c01Tuption in lending due to a greater motivation in 
shaping appropriate managerial incentives, introducing more competition and 
maintaining a good reputation. We therefore include two variables to measure the 
ownership structure of the banking industry. Foreign Ba l1k Ovvnersh伊 is the 
fraction of the banking system's assets in banks that are 50% or more owned by 
foreign investors. Private Bank Ownership is the fraction of the banking system's 
assets in banks that are 50% or more owned by private investors. In the regression 
analysis, the omitted group is state-owned banks. 
3.6. Additionα1 Bank Controls 
We also control for Deposit lnsurance, Bank Accounting and Creditor Rights. 
The first two variables are from BCL (2006) and the third one is from DMS 
(2007). Deposit lnsurance indicates whether there is an explicit deposit insurance 
scheme (Yes= 1, N 0=0) and, if not, whether depositors were fully compensated the 
last time a bank failed (Yes=l , No=O). The index ranges from 0 to 2. BCL (2006) 
point out that deposit insurance intensifies the moraI hazard problem in banking 
because depositors no longer face the risk of losing their savings, which 
diminishes their incentives to and efforts at monitoring bank activities. Hence, 
higher values of this index indicate less private monitoring. Bank Accou l1 tÎng 
measures whether the income statement includes accrued or unpaid interest or 
principal on perfonning and nonperfonning loans and whether banks are required 
to produce consolidated financial statements. A higher value indicates more 
infonnative bank financial statements. The Creditor Riσhts index measures the 。
powers possessed by secured lenders in a bankruptcy in four respects (DMS , 
2007). First, it measures whether there are restrictio l1s, such as creditor consent, 
for a debtor to file in reorganization. Second, whether secured creditors are able to 
seize their collateral after the reorganization petition is approved. Third, whether 
secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds from 1 iquidating a bankrupt finn. 
Last, whether the management retains administration of its prope討y pending the 
resolution of reorσanization. The index ranσes from 0 to 4. with hiσher values E 
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3.7. Firm Characteristics and Controls 
We include two dummy variables that identify a finn's ownership type. 
Dummy variable Government equals 1 if any govemment agency or state body has 
a financial stake in the ownership of a fir油， and 0 otherwise. State ownership of a 
finn may reduce briberγpayments due to stronger bargaining power and better 
political cOlU1ections than is the case for private finns (Svensson, 2003). In 
addition, the govemment may direct banks to provide policy loans to SOEs due to 
soft budget constraints. If so, state- owned companies have less incentive to bribe 
bank officials. Dummy variable Foreign equals 1 if any foreign investor has a 
financial stake in the ownership of a finn , and 0 otherwise. Foreign ownership of 
the finn is expected to be associated with fewer briberγpayments because local 
govemments are typically wi Il ing to provide be社er treatment to attract foreign 
direct investment. 1n addition, companies with foreign ownership may have 
various altemative channels in obtaining funds (e.g., foreiσn capital markets or 
simply by borrowing from foreign partners or the parent finn). 
Previous literature (La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1999, 2000, 2002) 
emphasizes the importance of the legal environment and contract enforcement to 
c。中orate govemance, firrn valuation, and reinvestment decisions. Similarly, the 
legal environment and contract enforcement may have potential impacts on 
co叮uption in lending. A good legal environment would increase the cost and 
reduce the ability of a govemment official to extract rents from enterprises. 
Similarly, we expect a good legal environment would increase the cost of 
co甘uption in bank lending. In our study, the empirical analysis includes two 
variables related to the legal environment and contract enforcement. The first 
variable is based on a question that asks about the fairness and impartiality of the 
court system in resolving business disputes (Court Fairness). The second variable 
is based on a question that asks about the enforceability of a court's decision (Law 
E份rcemenf). The survey offers respondents six choices: 1 (never), 2 (seldom), 3 
(sometimes), 4 (frequently), 5 (usuaUy), and 6 (always). A larger number 
represents a better system in terms of faimess and enforceability. 
Jn addition to the variables discussed above, we include several other 
enterprise-level controls. Firm Size is measured 
18 
c1assification variables are included in the analysis. For the sake of brevity, the 
coefficients of the industry classification variables are not repo此ed in the tables, 
but are available upon request. 
3.8. Countly Controls 
The empirical analysis also includes several country-level variables to control 
for differences in economic development and institutions across countries. Since 
Svensson (2005) finds evidence that higher GDP per capita is related to less 
con.uption, we include this variable in our analysis. Economic and political 
institutions, to the degree they restrict market and political competition, could 
influence the extent of corγuption in a country. We use the variables Openness 
(imports as a share of GDP) and Democracy (long-term democracy from 1950 to 
2000) from Triesman (2000) to capture these institutional factors. Furthermore, we 
include a series of other political and institutional quality indexes as a check on the 
robustness of the results. The World Govenlance lndexes (Kaufinann et a1., 1999) 
are constructed based on 276 individual variables taken from 31 different sources 
produced by 25 different organizations. The indexes measure different dimensions 
of govemance, which can be summarized as follows: 
(1) Voice and accountability (Voice) - the extent to which a country' s citizens are 
able to participate in selecting their govemment, as well as the extent to which 
they enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
(2) Goνernment effectiveness (Government EfJ告cti叫一 the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the govemmer前's commitment to such policies. 
(3) Rule 01law (LA 的一 the extent to which 、agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular, the quality of contract enforcement, 
the police, and the coulis, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
(4) Control of CorrLiption (Control 01 Corruption) - the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private ga泊， including both petty and grand forms üf 
COlTuption, as well as “capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
Higher values indicate better control of corruption. 
The indices are used altematively in our different models. The empirical 
results are robust to the inclusion of these additional variables. 
The correlations among the banking variables and finn-characteristic variables 
are presented in Table 3. 
[Table 3 here] 
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As can be seen from the table , multicollinearity is not a serious problem for 
the banking variables and finn-level variables. Most of the correlation coefficients 
are below 0.3, which makes us comfortable to include these variables in the 
models simultaneously. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Banking Competition and Corruption in Lending 
To explore the impact of bank competition on corruption in lending, we 
assume a finn' s latent response can be represented as follows: 
Bank Corruption,.} = α+β'Bωlk Competilion MeasuresJ + αIState， .J + α2 Foreign'.J 
+α3 Exporfe們 J + α4FMStet j +αJndusη DUn7mies' .J (1) 
+θ'AfGcro ConIrolsj+EJJ 
where the i and j subscripts indicate firm and country, respectively. The bank-
competition measures and country-control variables are as defined in the previous 
section. Unlike the latent variable, the observed dependent variable, 
Bank Corruption' .J is a polychotomous variable with a natural order. Specifically, a 
finn classifies corruption in lending into 4 categories, with 3 threshold 
parameters ， 人. We therefore use the ordered probit model to estimate the λ-
parameters together with the regression coefficients simultaneously. We use the 
standard maximum likelihood estimation with heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors. The basic results are reported in columns (1 )-(4) of Table 4. 
[Table 4 here] 
As BCL (2006 , p.238) point out, questions arise as to whether this type of 
equation should be estimated using clustering or not. When clustering the standard 
errors by country, observations are not restricted to be independent within 
countries; rather, observations are required to be independent across countries. The 
assumption of clustering seems more reasonable in our context. We therefore 
follow BDL (2006) with clustering the standard errors by country and repeat the 
analysis with the results reported in columns (5)-(8) of Table 4. As can be seen , 
the coefficients are the same but less significant when we allow for clustering by 
country. The magnitude of the ordered probit coefficients cannot be simply 
interpreted as the marginal effects of a one-unit increase in the independent 
variables on the dependent variable, although the sign and statistical significance 
of the coefficients are similar to the linear regression interpretations. We quantify 
the magnitude of the impact on an average firm when we discuss the results in 
Table 6 below. 
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In Table 4, the most important finding is that banking competition reduces 
corruption in lending. As can be seen in the table, the còefficients of Bank 
Concentration (Deposit) and Bank Concentration μsset) are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 % level in most model specifications, suggesting 
that increased concentration (i .e., less competitiveness) results in a more severe 
problem of corruption in lending. The coefficients of Ently Barrier are positive 
and statistically significant at the 50/0 level or less in all model specifications. The 
coefficients of Application Denied are positive and marginally significant after 
clustering the standard errors by country. All these results strongly support our 
theoretical hypothesis that lower entry ba叮iers and less stringent entry restrictions 
reduce corruption in lending. 
Also consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficients of Foreign Bank 
Ovvnersh加 are negative and statistically significant in all model specifications. 
The coefficients of Private Bank Ownersh伊 are negative but only statistically 
significant in the models without clustering by country. These results show some 
support of our hypothesis that greater private and foreign ownership in a country's 
banking industry reduce co汀uption in lending. 
Furthennore, as we expected, the coefficients of Court Fairness and Law 
Enforcement are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating 
that a better legal environment and contract enforcement help reduce corruption in 
lending. Finn characteristics also have some impact on corruption in lending. 
Specifically, in a l1 specifications, state-owned finns and foreign-owned finns are 
less likely to rate bank corruption as an obstacle to growth. This finding is 
consistent with the prior expectation that finns that have more govemment 
connections, soft budget constraints and stronger bargaining power suffer less 
from co汀uption. Firm Size is negatively related to corruption in lending, but only 
statistically significant in the models without clustering by country. Exporting 
finns are associated with less corruption in lending，的 indicated by the negative 
and statistically significant coefficients in all model specifications. Regarding the 
other macro controls, creditor rights is negatively associated with corruption in 
lending, but only statistically signifìcant in the models without cl 
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4.2. J，可ormation Sharing, Competition and Corruption in Lending 
1n Table 5, we add to the regressions in Table 4 the five measures of 
infonnation sharing: the existence of a public credit registry, the existence of a 
private bureau, the extemal auditing and disclosure of a firm 's financial statements, 
the age of the public credit registry and the age of the private bureau. The model 
can be expressed as follows: 
Bank Corruption ,.) = α+β， Bank Conpelition Measures) + δ'Informatioll Sharing Measures) 
+αISfate ，.) +a]Foreign,.) + 叭Expο的1:j+ 叫 Firm Si~e ， .j (2) 
+αI IndusllY Dummies人) +θ'λlacro CO l1trols j + &, .) 
The empirical results are presented in Table 5. The robust standard errors are 
clustered by country. 
[Table 5 here] 
As can be seen from Table 5, the existence of a private bureau significantly 
reduces corruption in lending, as indicated by the negative and statistically 
significant coefficients of Private Bw吧。u in all model specifications. In contrast, 
the coefficients of Public Credit Registry are not statistical1y significant. This is 
probab1y due to the nature of public credit registries in contrast to private bureaus. 
As we discussed ear1 ier, the infonnation available from public credit registries 
consists mainly of credit data above a certain thresho1d (minimum 10an size) and is 
disseminated in consolidated fonn (no details on individual loans). The private 
credit bureaus, in contrast, offer details on individual loans and merge the credit 
data with other data from other sources (e.g. , courts , tax authorities , and financial 
statements), though they are 1ess comprehensive in coverage. The empirical 
evidence shows that private bureaus play a more effective role in reducing the 
infonnation gap between lenders and borrowers, and consequently corruption in 
lending. The coefficients of Firm Auditing are negative and statistica l1y significant 
at the 1 % level in all model specifications, indicating that more accurate 
information disclosure lowers corruption in lending. Overall, the results strongly 
support our hypothesis that infonnation sharing reduces corruption in lending. 
We also include the age of public credit registries and the age of private 
bureaus in the models and find that the age of private bureaus is negatively and 
statistically associated with corruption in lending, which bolsters our earlier 
finding by showing that the infonnation-sharing amount is negatively related to 
bank corruption. In contrast, the coefficient of public registry age is not 
statistica l1y significant. As we discussed ear1 ier, this is probably due to the nature 
of public credit registries being used mainly as a kind of enforcement device in 
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many countries. Only current data are distributed and the data on defaults or late 
payments are erased once they have been paid. Therefore, the public credit 
registries do not offer a historical record of a borrower's credit behavior (Miller, 
2003). It is therefore not su中rising to find that the age of the public credit registry 
is not associated with corruption in lending. 
1n columns (5)-(6), we include the key variables of banking competition and 
information sharing into the models simultaneously. As can be seen, the empirical 
results are very similar to our previous findings that information sharing and 
banking competition are associated with less coπuption in lending. 
The other variables that are included also yield similar results. Foreign Bank 
Ownership and Priνate Bank Ownership are negatively and statistically 
siεnificantly associated with corruption in lending. The coefficients of both Fair 
Court and Law Enforcement are negative and statistically significant at the 1 % 
level in a11 models , indicating that a better legal environment and contract 
enforcement reduce corruption in lending. State-owned firms and foreign-owned 
finns suffer less from corruption in lending in a11 model specifications. Exporting 
firms are associated with less corruption in lending, as indicated by the negative 
and statistically significant coefficients in a11 model specifications. 
The effect of competition and infonnation sharing on corruption in lending is 
not only statistically significant, but also economically significant. 1n order to 
demonstrate the magnitude of the impacts of information sharing and competition 
on bank corruption, we use model (5) in Table 5 to quantify the effect that 
inforrnation sharing and competition have on the probability that corruption in 
lending is rated as an obstacle to firm growth. Specifically, we compute the change 
in the probability that a finn rates corruption of bank officials as no obstac\e (a 
minor obstacle, a moderate obstacle, or a major obstacle) due to a change in the 
bank competition and infonnation sharing variables for an average finn. The 
empirical results ofthis i11ustrative exercise are presented in Table 6. 
[Table 6 here] 
As can be seen, the magnitude of the economic impacts is quite large. For 
instance, the estimates imply that an one standard deviation increase in banking 
concentration would lead to a 4.3 percentage point increase in the probabili 
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growth increases by 19.6 percentage points and the probability that a finn rates 
bank COlTuption as not an obstacle to firm growth decreases by about 30 
percentage points. The effects are quite substantial given that about 12% of the 
finns in the sample report that corruption in lending is a major obstacle to their 
growth and about 58% of the finns say that bank co叮uption is not an obstacle for 
growth. 
Similarly, the estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in 
Application Denied would lead to a 3 percentage point increase in the probability 
that a finn rates bank corruption as a major obstacle and a 4.8 percentage point 
decrease in the probability that a finn rates bank corruption as not an obstacle to 
finn growth. A one standard deviation increase in Entry Barrier would lead to a 
5.1 percentage point increase in the probability that a finn rates bank corruption as 
a major obstacle and a 8 percentage point decrease in the probability that a finn 
rates bank corruption as not an obstacle to finn growth. Again, a11 these effects are 
quite substantial given that only about 12% of the firms in the sample report that 
corruption in lending is a major obstacle to their growth and about 58% of the 
finns report that bank corruption is not an obstacle for growth. 
Regarding the dummy variables, we calculate the discrete change in the 
probability that that a finn rates bank corruption as an obstacle to growth due to a 
change in the dummy variable from 0 to 1. The existence of a private bureau 
would lead to a 4.1 percentage point decrease in the probability that that a firm 
rates bank corruption as a major obstacle. The disclosure of audited financial 
statements would lead to a 3 .3 percentage point decrease in the probability that 
that a finn rates bank corruption as a major obstaçle. The existence of a deposit 
insurance scheme would result in a 2.8 percentage pòint increase in the probability 
that that a finn rates bank corruption as a major obstacle. The presence of foreign 
and govemment ownership would result in 3 .4 and 1.6 percentage point decreases 
in the probability that that a finn rates bank corruption as a major obstacle, 
respectively. 
5. Robustness Tests 
5.1. Probit Analysis and Instrument Variable Analysis 
The fact that we do not have a balanced distribution of responses across the 
four categories of answers regarding corruption of bank lending might invalidate 
the ordered probit estimates or a few outliers in one of the categories with a small 
number of responses could exert an undue influence on the results (see BDL, 
2006). In order to allow us to use a comparatively balanced distribution of 
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responses and .lower the likelihood that idiosyncratic 叮叮n responses are biasing 
the results, wè follow BDL (2006) in constructing a bank co汀uption dummy 
(Corruption DU l11l11y ) that takes on the value of zero if “ no obstacle" and one if the 
finn 's response is “ minor",“moderate" or “ major". 13 We use this lending 
con'uption dummy as the dependent variable and repeat the entire analysis with the 
probit regressions. The results are reported in columns (l)一 (3) ， Table 7. 
[Table 7 here] 
As can be seen in Table 7, the results are very similar to our previous findings. 
The coefficients of Banking Concentration, Ently Barrier and Application Denied 
are positive and statistically significant in all model specifications, indicating that 
banking competition reduces the likelihood that a finn rates bank co汀uption as an 
obstacle. We also evaluate the marginal effect on an average finn at the median 
values of the independent variables. For instance, a 10 percentage point increase 
in Bank Concentration will increase the probability that a finn rates bank 
corruption as an obstacle by 4 percentage points. A 10 percentage point increase in 
Application Denied wi lI increase the probability that a finn rates bank corruption 
as an obstacle by 1.2 percentage points. A one standard deviation increase in Ently 
Barrier would result in a 2.7 percentage point increase in the probability that a 
finn rates bank corruption as an obstacle. All these results confinn our finding thût 
greater banking competition, in tenns of lowering concentration, lowering entrγ 
barriers and imposing less stringent entrγrestrictions ， reduces corruption in 
lending. 
明1 ith respect to the infonnation-sharing variable, the existence of a private 
bureau is negatively associated with the corruption in lending. The existence of a 
public registry, however, does not have a significant impact on the probability that 
a finn rates bank con'uption as an obstacle. Finn infonnation disclosure reduces 
the probability that a finn rates bank corruption as an obstacle. Regarding the 
marginal effect evaluated at the median value of the independent variables, the 
existence of a private bureau and firm infonnation disclosure reduces the 
probability that a film rates bank corruption as an obstacle by 13 and 12 
percentage points, respectively. 1n addition, both private and foreign ownership of 
bank are negatively associated with the probability of co甘upt
13 ln our sal11 p怡、 5 8% of fìnn s responded that corrupt ion in bank lending is not a signifìcant barri er to 
fìr l11 g ro \叫h ， while 42% indicated that bank corruption is an obstac le, with sO l11 e indicating it is a min肘，
moderate, or major obstacle. 
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Similarly, both the presence of govemment and foreign ownership reduce the 
probability that a finn rates bank corruption as an obstac1e. The existence of a 
Deposit Insw戶ance Scheme increases the probability that an average firm rates 
bank corruption as an obstac1e by about 10 percentage points, which echoes the 
finding by BDL (2006). Overa l1, the results provide illustrative evidence of the 
potential magnitude of the importance of our findings on competition and 
infonnation. 
1n our study, the potential for endogeneity being a problem is less of a concem 
than in pure cross-country analysis because we are examining the impact of 
banking-market competition and the existence of infonnation-sharing agencies on 
individual finns. It seems unlikely that an individual finn's view about corruption 
in lending will influence nation-wide banking competition and infonnation-
sharing schemes ((BCL, 2006). Even though there may be feedback from the 
corporate sector to policy making: if high levels of co汀uption in lending do 
generate calls for more banking competition and infonnation shari時， the 
empirical relationship between banking competition/infonnation sharing should be 
positive. However, we find a negative relationship between banking 
competition/infonnation sharing and corruption in lending. Furthennore, among 
the countries with information-sharing schemes, more than 85% of them set up the 
schemes 3 or more years prior to our sample period. 
Nevertheless, we conduct some robustness tests using instrumental variable 
probit analysis. 14 The empirical results are presented in column (4) 一 (6)， Table 7. 
We base the selection of instrumental variables on the theoretical and empirical 
work in the law, institution and finance literature (Acemoglu and 10hnson, 2005 , 
BDL, 2003 , Easterly and Levine, 1997, LLSV, 1998, "1999). From the law and 
finance perspective, LLSV (1 999) and BDL (2003) show that the historically 
detennined differences in legal traditions help explain intemational differences in 
financial systems today. Moreover, legal origin can be thought of as “exogenous" 
because it was imposed by colonial power in many emerging countries (Acemoglu 
and 10hnson, 2005; LLSV, 1999). We therefore include legal origin (English, 
French) 的 instrumental variables for the banking competition measures using data 
from DMS (2007). The English legal origin inc1 udes the common law of England 
an 
14 To our knowledge, the instrurnental variable estirnators have not been developed for the ordered 
probit anal ys is used in the earlier section. 
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environment in shaping the political and tìnancial institutional development 
(Acemoglu et aI., 2001 , 8eck et a l., 2003). 8eck et al. (2003) find strong evidence 
that geographical endow l11 ent has substantial il11 pacts on the fonnation of long-
lasting institutions that shape financial develop l11ent. We therefore follow 8DL 
(2005 , 2006) in using latitude 1S as an instrumental variable for the competition 
and information-sharing measures. 16 We also include the ethnic fractionalization 17 
as an instrumental variable because it has been found that economies with greater 
ethnic diversity tend to choose institutions that allow those in power to expropriate 
resources from others (8DL 2003 , 2006). Lastly, it is also reported that a country ' s 
cu1ture heritage, as proxied by religion composition, has a significant impact on 
shaping its political and tìnancial institutions (LLSV, 1999, Stulz and Williamson, 
2003). In model 6 (column 6, table 7), we therefore inc1 ude religion composition 
as additional IVs. 
As can be seen from the table, the empirical resu1ts are rather robust. The 
coeftìcients of Banking Concentration remain positive and statistically significant 
in a11 model specifications, indicating that banking competition reduces the 
likelihood that a finn rates bank corruption as an obstacle. The coefficients of 
Entry Barrier and Application Denied are also positive and statistically significant 
across the model specitìcations. All these results bolster our finding that banking 
competition, in tenns of lowering concentration, lowering entry barriers and 
imposing less stringent entry restrictions, is associated with less corruption in 
lending. As regarding the infonnation variable, the empirical result is also 
consistent with our previous tìndings. The existence of a private bureau reduces 
the probability that a finn rates bank corruption as an obstac1e. Again, we do 110t 
tìnd a significant relation between the existence of a public registry and corruption 
in lending. In addition, the coeftìcient of finn infom1ation disclosure remains 
negative though it is not statistically significant. 
Regarding the control variables, the private and foreign ownership of the 
banking industry are negatively associated with corruption in lending. The 
presence of govemment and foreign ownership is negatively associated with the 
probability that a finn rates bank corruptio l1 as an obstacle. Moreove 
的 The abso lute value of the latitude of the count巾， scaled to take a va lue between 0 and 1, is from 
LLSV ( 1999) 
16 We did not use the rn ortality rati o proposed by Acernoglu and Johnson (2001) because it has a srnall 
oyerl ap in countries cornpared with the sample we are using 
" We use the avera!!e va lue of ftve different indices of ethnical fracti onali zati on. The data are frorn 
Easterly and Levine (1997). 
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regressions, which is consistent with our theoretical hypothesis. Overall, the 
results are very consistent with our previous findings and predictions. 
5.2. More Country Controls 
Next, we address the issue of potential omitted variables. Since the overall 
quality of the institutional environment might influence corruption in lending, we 
include a series of macro-institutional indexes in our model to test the robustness 
of the results. 
We control for Democracy (long-tenn democracy from 1950 to 2000) and 
Openness (imports as a share of GDP), using data from Triesman (2000). 
Furthennore, we include a series of political and institutional quality indexes to 
check the robustness of the results. The World Govemance Indexes compiled by 
Kaufmann et al. (2006) are used to capture different aspects of the institutional 
environment (voice and accountability, govemment effectiveness, rule of law, and 
control of corruption). The detailed definitions of the indexes are presented in 
section 3. 18 Because some indexes are highly correlated with each other, we 
include the indexes individually in the models. The results are presented in Table 8. 
[Table 8 here] 
As can be seen from the table, the empirical results are highly consistent with 
our previous findings. The competition and infonnation-sharing variables are 
significantly and negatively associated with corruption in lending. Most of the 
mäcrö-control variables are not statistically significant, indicating that the legal 
environment and institution quality are well controlled for by the finn-level , legal-
environment variables and other macro-control variables like GDP per capita. 
6. Conclusion 
Our paper examines whether bank competition and infonnation sharing help 
curtail corruption in bank lending. We use three unique datasets: (1) the World 
Bank Business Environment Survey (2000) which contains direct firm-level 
infonnation on the degree to which corruption in bank lending represents an 
obstacle to firms ; (2) the data complied by Barth et al. (2006) which provides 
detailed infonnation about various dimensions of bank competition and regulation 
across different countries during 2001-2003; and (3) the data from Djankov et 
a1.(2007) on public credit registries and private credit bureaus in 129 countries 
during 1978-2003. We obtain two main empirical results. First， σreater 
competition in banking helps to curtail corruption in bank lending. Second, 
18 Kaufmann et al. (2006) compile the world govemance indicators from 1996 to 2005 . We use the 
value of the index for 1999 in our analysis. 
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information sharing v ia credit registries/bureaus helps reduce corruption in bank 
lending. 
Beyond these two important results, wë find that govemment. and foreign-
owned finns as well as exporting finns tend to be subject to less lending 
corruption; objective courts and better law enforcement tend to reduce lending 
corruption; greater private and foreign ownership of the banking industry are 
associated with more integrity in lending; and that more private monitoring of 
banks helps to curtail lending corruption. Both our major findings and other results , 
moreover, pass a number of robustness tests. 
Our findings complement the recent, pioneering work of Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine (2006) which is to our best knowledge the only existing study of 
the detenninants of corruption in obtaining bank loans by finns. Using datasets (1) 
and (2) mentioned above, they examine the role of bank supervision in combating 
lending corruption. They find that strengthening traditional official supervision 
does not have a positive impact on the integrity of bank lending, but instead, a 
supervisory strategy that focuses on empowering private monitoring of banks 
through the disclosure of accurate and timely infonnation reduces lending 
corruption. We focus on the role of market institutions, in particular on market 
competition and infonnation-sharing mechanisms in the form of credit bureaus 
(and public credit registries) in reducing bank-lending corruption. Controlling for 
finn characteristics and including bank and macro controls, we find that 
competition among banks and infonnation sharing among lenders (especially via 
private credit bureaus) are both important in reducing bank corruption. 
Our findings have important policy i1J1plications. First, our resuIts show that 
one positive and important aspect of bank" competition is in reducing corruption, 
apart from any impacts on banking efficiency and stability. The finding regarding 
information sharing also sheds light on the positive role that market institutions 
like private credit bureaus can play in reducing corruption in bank lending. 
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Table 1: Dcfinitions and Sources of Variables 
Variable Defìnition Original Sources 
8ank Corruptio l1 Corruption of bank officials as an obstacle for the operation World 8usiness 
and growth of your busi ness. (1-110 obstacle、 2- minor Environment Survey 
obstacle，于 a moderate obstacle‘ 4-major obstacle) (W8ES、 2000)
8ank The fraction oftotal deposits held by the five largest banks in 8arth et al. (2006) 
Concentratìon the industry. The data are compiled based on a survey of 
(Deposit) banking regulators in 150 countrìes in 2001 
8ank The fraction oftotal assets held by the five largest banks in 8arth et al. (2006) 
Concentration the industry. The data are compiled based on a survey of 
(Asset) banking regulators in 150 countries in 2001 
Entry 8arrier Entry into 8anking Requirement, which is a variable 8arth et al. (2006) 
developed based on eight questi ons regarding whether various 
types of leg訓 submission are required to obtain a banking 
license. Which ofthe following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance ofthe banking license? (1 )Draft by-
laws? (2)lntended organization chart? (3) Financial 
projections for fìrst three years? (4) Financial infonnation on 
main potential shareholders? (5) 8ackground/experience of 
future di rectors? (6) 8ackground/experience of future 
managers? (7) Sources of funds to be disbursed in the 
capitalization ofnew bank? (8) Market differentiation 
intended for the new bank? The index ranges 什om 0 (Iow 
entry requirement) to 8 (high entry requirement). Higher 
values indicate greater stringency 
Application The percentage 10 which applications 10 enter banking are 8arth et al. (2006) 
Oenied denied in the past fìve years. The data are compiled based on 
a survey of banking regulators in 150 countries in 2001 
Foreign 8ank The 什action ofthe banking system's assets in Ihe banks that 8arth et al. (2006) 
Ownership are 50 percent or more owned by for巴ign investors. The data 
are compil ed based on a survey of banking regulators in 150 
countries in 2001 
Private 8 ank The fraction of the banking system's assets in the banks that 8arth et al. (2006) 
Ownership are 50 p巴rcenl or more owned by private investors. The data 
are compiled based on a survey 10 banking regulators in 150 
countries in 2001 
Public Credit The variable equals one ifa public credit registry operates in Djankov et al. (2007) 
Registry the country by the end of 1999, zero otherwise. A public 
registry is defined as a database owned by public authorities 
(usua lly the central bank or banking supervisor authority) that 
co ll ects infon11ation on the standing of borrowers in the 
tìnancial sys tem and makes it available to financial 
lnstltutlons 
Public R巴gistry Years of establishment since the starting date ofthe public Djankov et al. (2007) 
Age registry 
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Variable Detìnition Original Sources 
Private Bureau The variable equals one ifa private credit bureau operates in Djankov et al. (2007) 
the count可 by the end of 1999, zero otherwise. A private 
bureau is detìned as a private commercial fìrm that maintains 
a database on the standing of borrowers in the fìnancial 
system, and its primary role is to facilitate exchange of 
information amongst banks and tìnancial institutions 
Private Bureau Years of establishment since the starting date of oldest private Djankov et al. (2007) 
Age credit bureau in the country 
Firm Auditing Does the tìrm provide its shareholders with annual tìnancial World Business 
statements that have been reviewed by an extemal auditor Environment Survey 
(Yes斗， No=O)? Higher value indicates more information 引f13 ES， 2000) 
disclosure of the tìnn 
Deposit Insurance This variable indicates whether there is an explicit deposit Barth et al. (2006) 
insurance scheme (Yes=l , No=O) and, ifnot, whether 
depositors were fully compensated the last time a bank failed 
(Yes= 1, No=O). The index ranges from 0 to 2. Higher values 
indicate less private monitoring 
Bank Accοunting Whether the income statement includes accrued or unpaid Barth et al. (2006) 
interest or principal on perforrning and nonperforrning loans 
and whether banks are required to produce consolidated 
tìnancial statements. Higher value indicates more inforrnative 
bank account. 
Creùitor Riζhts The index measures the power of secured lenders in Djankov et al. (2007) 
bankruptcy. A score of one is assigned when each of the 
following 吋刮ltS of secured lenders are defìned in laws and 
regulations : First, there are restrictions, such as cr它ditor
consent, for a debtor to tìle reorganization. Second, secured 
creditors are able to seize their cοIlateral a仇er the 
reorganization petition is approved. Third, secured creditors 
are paid first out of the pro臼eds of liquidating a bankrupt 
firm. Last, management does not retain administration of its 
property pending the resolution ofthe reorganization. The 
index ranges from 0 to 4. Hiεher val ue i ndicates stronεer 
creditor rights 
Govemment Dummy variable equals to 1 if any govemment agency or World Business 
state body has a fìnancial stake in the ownership ofthe tìrrn , 0 Environment Survey 
otherwise. (WBES, 2000) 
Foreign Dummy variable equals to I if any foreign company and Wor1 d Business 
individual has a tinancial stake in the ownership ofthe fìrrn Environment Su 
Law Enforcement "ln resolving b凶iness dispute, do you believe yo ur country' World Business 
court system to be decision enforced," categorical variable, 0- Environment Survey 
never, I-seldom‘ 2-sometimes ， 3- frequent旬， 4-usually, 5- (WBES, 2000) 
always. Hi gher value indicates better law enforcement 
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Yariab le 
Fair Court 
Competiti on 
Exporter 
Firm Size 
Definiti on Original Sources 
"In resolving husiness di s put巳 do you beli eve your country ‘ World Business 
court system to be fair and imparti al," categorical va riabl e. 0- Environlllent Survey 
never, l-se ldom, 2-sometimes， 于rrequently， 4-us ua l 旬 ， 6- (WBES‘ 2000) 
always. Higher va lue indicates better court quality 
Regarding your fi rm's 111句 or prod uct line、 how many World Business 
competitors do you face in your market? Environment Survey 
(WBES, 2000) 
Thi s dummy va ri ab le takes on the value 1 iffìrrn expo巾， 0 World Bus iness 
otherwise. Environment Survey 
(WBES, 2000) 
Nature logarithm offinn sales. World Business 
Environment Survey 
(WBES, 2000) 
fnfl ation 3 year average percentage inflation, GDP deflator. World Development 
Tndicators (WDI) 
GDP per Capita Logarithm of ~'Toss national product per capita in 1999. World Development 
1ndicators (WDI) 
Yoice and The indicator which measures the extent to which a count旬's Kaufmann et al. (2006) 
Accountability citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, 
as we ll as freedom of expression、 freedom of association, and 
free media. The value of year 1999 is used in thi s study 
Hi gher values mean greater political ri ghts 
Govemment The indicator which measure the quality of public services, Kaufmann et al. (2006) 
Effectiveness the quality ofthe civil service and the degree ofits 
independence from political press ures ‘ the quality ofpolicy 
formulati on and implementati on, and the credibi lity ofthe 
government' s commitment to such policies. The value of year 
1999 is us巴d in thi s study. Hi gher values mean hi gher quality 
ofpublic and civil service 
Rule of Law The indicator which measure the extent to whi ch agents have Kaufmann et al. (2006) 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society 、 and in 
parti cul ar the quality of contract enforcement‘ the police, and 
the cou t1.s, as well as the likelihood ofcrirne and violence 
The value of year 1999 is used in this study. Hi gher values 
mean stronger law and order 
Control of The indicator whi ch measure the extent to whi ch public power Kaufmann et al. (2006) 
Corruption is exercis巴d for private gai n‘ including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption‘ as we ll as “ capture" of the state by el ites 
and pri vate interests. The va lue of year 1999 is used in this 
study. Higher va lues indicate better control of corruption 
Democracy Democrat ic in all years since 1950 as of 2000 Treisman (2000) 
Openness 1mports ofgoods and services as % ofGDP, 2000. World Development 
1ndi cators (WDI) 
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Table 2: S ummary Statistics of Key Variahles 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Dev Mi ni mum Maximum 
Bank Corruption 8032 1.776 1.050 4 
Govemment 7726 0.1 17 0.322 O 
Fore ign 7752 0. 192 0.394 O 
Competitor 777 1 2.342 0.73 1 O 9 
Fair Court 7385 3.429 1.435 6 
Law Enforcement 7325 3.424 1.456 6 
Firm Size 7294 10. 174 7.556 0.11 25.33 
Exporter 7609 0.365 0.48 1 O 
Bank Concentration (Deposit) 62 0.656 0.19 1 0.21 
Bank Concentration (Asset) 64 0.629 0.188 0.14 
Application Denied 52 0.229 0.287 O 
Entry Barrier 69 7.464 0.964 8 
Public Registry 77 0.455 0.50 1 O 
Public Registry Age 66 9.015 15.323 O 65 
Pri vate B ureau 77 0.377 0.488 O 
Private Bureau Age 66 8.803 19.118 O 98 
Deposit lnsurance 69 0.696 0.464 O 
Bank Accounting 66 3.576 0.583 2 4 
Pri vate Bank Ownership 6 1 42.713 30.405 O 95 .2 
Foreign Bank Ownership 62 38.567 30.398 1.9 100 
Creditor Rights 77 1.935 1.104 O 4 
GDP per Capita (\og) 8 1 7.438 1.375 4.58 10 .38 
Voice and Accountability 81 0.013 0.823 -1.72 1.38 
Govemment Effect iveness 81 0.018 0.897 -1.42 2.57 
Ru\e ofLaw 81 -0.064 0.864 -1.34 2.04 
Control of Corruption 8 1 -0.086 0.935 -1.3 4 2 .48 
Democracy 78 0.\4 1 0.350 O 
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Table 3: Corre latio n Mat rix o f Kcy B a n ki n g Var iahles (Pa n e l A) 
Concenlralion COllcenlralion Enlry Enlry Public Privale Finn Privale Foreign Dcposit 8ank Credilor 
(Dq~os i t) (Ass巳t) ßarrier D巳nièd Re已 iSlry Regi slry Audiling 8ank ßank Insurance Ac已。unl l ll巴 Righ t
ß ank 
Conιcntrallon 
(Deposit) 
Concenlrali on 
(Asset) 
ßank 0.9335* 
Enl仰 ßarrier
Applicalion 
Denied 
Pub lic 
Registry 
Private 
ßureau 
m 
Auditing 
Pr叭'ale ßank 
Owncrship 
Foreign ßank 
Owm:rship 
-0.0850* -0.0799* 
-0.0940* -0.003 1 -0.1417* 
0.0482* 0.19 18* -0.0945* 0.1731* 
-0.1685* -0.1226' -0 .0137* 0.0584* 0.1568* 
-0.0665* -0.0058 -0.0404 * 0 .0915* 0.0777* 0.2206* 
-0.2132* -0.2050* -0.0596* -0. 1029* 0.0439* 0.2421 * 0.0855* 
0.3163* 0.3528* 。 19 11 * -0.0751 * -0.0366* 0.0049 -0.0507* -0.7 106* 
Depos it -0.0388* -0.0402* -0.0666" -0.143 1" -0.06 18* 0.167 1* 0.0252* 0.0829* -0.0 151 
Insurance 
Accounti ng 
Disclosure 
ßank -0. 1869* -0 .1712* 0.0019 -0.0785* 0.0077 0.1646* 0.0609* 0.0826* 0. 1447* -0.1929* 
Credilor 0.000 1 -0.006 1 0.0377* 0.0 126 -0.1380* -0. 100U* -0.0174 0.0645* 0.001 0.1608* -0.0807* 
Right 
Ta ble 3: Co r relatio n Matr ix o f F irm Level Va r iables (Pan e l B ) 
Fair Law Firm 
Corrupti on Govemment Foreign Audit Competitor Court Enforcement Size Exporter 
Corruption 
Govemment -0.0499* 
Foreign -0.0808* -0.0562* 
A udit -0. 15 10* 0.(1482* 0.1567* 
Competitor 。 0982* -0.0460 * -0.0964* -0 . 1026* 
Fair Court -0.1519* 0.0617* 。 0574* 0. 1568* 0 .0076 
Law Enforcement -0.1440* 0.0636* 0.0310* 0.0887* 0.0052 0 .470 1 * 
Firm Size -0.0948* -0.1 153* 0.2453* 0.3480* -0.3412* 0 .1254* 0.0512* 
Expo口er -0. 1028* 0.0508* 0.2412* 0 .2368* -0.0386* 0 .13 10* 0.0566* 0. 1361* 
37 
Table 4: Bank Com~e!ltio n and Corruption 
協' ithout Cuunlry C luslc::r E t1è:cl Wilh Counl叭! CIUSler Effc::cl 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5 ) (6) (7) (8) 
Bunking SeClor l 'ariubles 
Bank Con附c巴f附a剖叫t ion叫(Depo的s圳 10.846 1.257 0.846 1.257 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*" [0.029]** [0.003]"* 
Ba叭 Com:en l叫on (Asset) 0.654 0.903 0.654 0.903 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*" [0.054]* [0.020]** 
Enlry 8arrier 0. 166 0.277 0.25 。 1 76 。 1 66 0.277 0.25 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [O.OOOJ*" [0.000]*** [0.022]** [0.029]" [0.005]*** [0.008]*** 
Applicalion Denied 0.506 0.425 。 506 0.425 
[0.000]*" [0.000]'" [0.064]* [0.1 33] 
Privale 8ank Ownership 
-0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 
[0.000]*** [0.000 ]叫* [0.002]艸* [0.000]" . [0.070]. [0.064]* [0.322] [0.265] 
Foreign Bank Ownership 
-0.0 1 -0.0 11 -0.0 11 -0.0 1 -0.01 -0.0 11 -0.0 11 
[0.000]'** [0.000]'" [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.017]** [0.016]" [0.01 1]** [0.018]** 
Firm-Ievel I包riables
Government 1-0.233 -0.23 1 -0.284 -0.283 -0.233 -0.23 1 -0.284 -0.283 
[0.000)*** [O.OOOj" * [O.OOOJ** ' [0.000]**' [0.0 16]*' [0.017]** [0.003]** . [0.003)**. 
Foreign 
-0. 181 -0.1 66 -0. 169 -0.174 -0.181 -0.1 66 -0.1 69 
[0.00 1)'" [0.000]*** [0.004)*" [0.003]*** [0.00 1]**. [0.000]** ' [0.004 ]抖， [0.004]*** 
Competitor 0.023 0.038 0.04 1 0.0 19 0.023 0.038 0.041 
[0.525] [0.426] [0.252] [0.2 12] [0.715) [0.65 1) [0.53 1] [0.496] 
Fair Cou口
-0.044 -0.047 -0.046 -0.047 -0.044 -0.047 -0.046 
[0.002)“* [0.004]*** [0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.020]** [0.028)*' [0.018]" [0.02 1)** 
Law Enforcement 1-0.096 -0.099 -0.089 -0.092 -0.096 -0.099 -0.089 -0.092 
10 .000)*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]"* [0 . 000]叫 * [0.00 1]“* [0.000]抖*
Firm Size 
-0.0 1 -0.0 19 -0υ 1 8 -0.0 1 -0.01 -0.019 -0.0 18 
[0.002]*** [0.00 1]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]'** [0.302] [0.242] [0.070]. [0.095]* 
Exporter 1-0. 137 -0. 138 -0.154 -0.1 62 -0. 137 -0.138 -0.154 -0.1 62 
[0.001 ]*** [0.00 1]*** [ 0 .00 1]抖· [0.00 1]*** [0.020]** [0.021]** [0.011]** [0.008]*** 
Olher Conlrols 
Credi tor Right 1-0.038 -0.038 -0.04 1 -0.036 -0.038 -0.038 -0.04 1 -0.036 
[0.050]*' [0.044]** [0 .086]* [0. 132] [0.494] [0.483] [0.525] [0.597] 
Deposit [nsurance 0.166 。 1 5 1 0.109 0.192 0.166 0.15 1 0.109 
(0.000]叫* [0 . 000]抖* [0 .002]叫* [0.025]" (0.182] (0.224] [0.253] [0.4 19) 
Olher Macro-contro ls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Dummies yes ves yes yes ves yes yes 
Observati ons 4395 3568 3568 4349 4395 3568 3568 
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8ank corruption is the response to the question "Is the corruption of bank offìcials as an obstacle for the 
operation and growth of your business (I-no obstacle. 2- minor obstacle, 3- a moderate obstacle、 4-major
obstacle)". 8ank concentration (Deposit) is the fraction of total deposits held by the tive largest banks in the 
industry. 8ank concentration (Asset) is the fracti on of total assets held by the tive largest banks in the industry 
Entry barrier measures the entry into banking requiremer吭， which is a variable develop巴d bas巴d on eight 
questions regarding whether various types of legal submission are required to obtain a banking license. The 
index ranges from 0 (Iow entry requirement) to 8 (high entry requirement). Higher values indicate greater 
stringency. Application Denied is the percentage 10 which applications to enter banking are denied in the past 
five years. Private 8ank Ownership indicates of the banking system's assets in the banks that are 50 percent or 
more owned by private investors. Foreign 8ank Ownership indicates the share of banks own巳d by foreign 
investors. Goverηment is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if any govemment agency or state body has a 
tinancial stake in the ownership of the fìrrn ‘ o othenvise. Foreign is a dummy variable which equals to I if any 
foreign company or individual has a financial stake in the ownership ofthe firrn. Law enforcement is a fìrm level 
survey indicator which measures the enforceabil ity of court 's decision with a higher value indicating better law 
enforcement. Law enforcement is a tirrn \evel survey indicator which measures the faimess and impartialness of 
court's decision with a higher value indicating more faimess . Finn size is the natural logarithm of firrn sales in 
US$. Exporter is a dummy variable that takes on value one ifthe firrn is an exporter and zero otherwise. Creditor 
Rights is an index which measures the power of secured lenders in bankruptcy defined in laws and regulations 
The index ranges from 0 to 4 with a higher value indicating stronger creditor rights. Deposit Insurance indicates 
whether there is an explicit deposit insurance scheme and whether depositors were fully comp巴nsated the last 
time a bank failed. Other macro controls (GDP per capita and in f1ation) and industry dummies are also included 
For brevity, the coeflicients are not presented but are available upon reques t. The regressions are run with 
ordered probit, which is based on standa 
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Table 5 : In fo rma t ion ‘ Com petitio n a nd Corr uption 
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Public Credit Registry 0. 11 1 0.157 0.097 0.006 0.039 0.018 
[0 .446] [0.257] [0 .473] [0.966] [0.80 1] [0.909] 
Private 8ureau -0 .483 -0.405 -0.318 -0.296 -0 .361 -0.357 
[0 . 008]料* [0.022]** [0.055]* [0.094]* [0.043]** [0.040]** 
Public Registry Age 0.006 
[0.22 1] 
Private 8 ureau Age -0.006 -0.007 
[0 . 007]*抖 [0. 00 1 ]抖*
Finn Auditi ng -0.274 -0.224 -0.223 -0.300 -0.285 
[0 . 00 1]抖 * [0 .00 1 ]叫* [0.00 1]抖* [0.001 ]料* [0 . 000]艸*
8ank Concentration (Deposit) 1.064 
[0.004]*** 
8ank Concentration (Asset) 0.820 
[0.042]** 
Entry 8arrier 0 .211 0.235 
[0.007]*** [0 . 006]料*
Application Denied 0.386 0.454 
[0.099]* [0.060]* 
Private 8 ank Ownership -0.00 1 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 
[0.795 ] [0.539] [0 . 020]料 [0 . 016]抖 [0.268] [0.319] 
Foreign 8ank Ownershi p -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 
[0.574] [0.527] [0 .021 ]抖 [0 . 035 ]抖 [0.044]** [0 . 030]材
Govemment -0.278 -0.25 1 -0 .308 -0.304 -0.29 -0.295 
[0.003 ] *抖 [0 . 009]抖* [0 . 000]*抖 [O.OOO]!抖 [0 . 003]料* [0.002]*** 
Foreign -0. 167 -0.137 -0.129 -0.13 -0.138 -0. 14 1 
[0 . 00 1]材* [0 . 0 1 5]抖 [0.027]** [0.026]** [0.026]** [0.02 1 ]** 
Competitor -0.012 -0.006 0.002 -0.007 0.018 0.015 
[0.805] [0.899] [0.97 1] [0.897] [0.734] [0.784] 
Fair Court -0.048 -0.042 -0.041 -0.044 -0.05 1 -0.052 
[0 . 013]抖 [0.032]叫 [0 . 035]艸 [0 . 027]抖 [0.004] *叫 [0 . 005]***
Law Enforcement -0.097 -0.097 -0.093 -0.093 -0.084 -0.082 
[0 . 000]抖* [0.000]抖* [0 . 000]*抖 [0.000 ]抖* [0 .000]料* [0 . 000]料*
Finn Size 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.000 
[0.868] [0.600] [0.446] [0.457] [0.984] [0 .988] 
Expo鬥er -0.204 -0.169 -0.146 -0.154 -0.184 -0.176 
[0 . 000]料* [0 . 001 ]抖* [0.005]*** [0 . 002]料* [0.00 1 ]料* [0.002]*** 
Creditor Rights -0 .055 -0 .06 -0.033 -0.036 -0.046 -0.049 
[0.339] [0.280] [0.564] [0.543] [0 .445] [0.386] 
Depos it Insurance 0.225 0.237 0.269 0.264 0.224 0.256 
[0.086]* [0.060]* [0.031]** [0.026]抖 [0.032]** [0.015]** 
8ank Accounting Disclosure 0.042 0.087 0.054 0.066 0.147 0.15 
[0.698] [0.385] [0.604] [0.501 ] [0.222] [0.165] 
Other Macro Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 4,350 4,076 3,935 3,935 3,270 3,270 
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8ank corruption is the response to the question “ Is the corruption of bank officials as an obstacle for the 
operation and growth of your business (I-no obstacle、 2- minor obstacle, 3- a moderate obstacle, 4-major 
obstacle)". Puhlíc Credít Regístry ís a dummy varíable whích takes on value one íf a public credít regístry 
operates in the count門I by the end of 1999、 zero otherwise. Public Regístry Age is the years of establishment 
since the startíng date of the public credit regístry. Private ßureau is a dummy variables whích takes on v31ue 
one ifa private credít bureau operates in the country by the end of 1999‘ zero otherwise. Prívate ßureau Age is 
the years of establíshment since the startíng date of oldest prívate credit bureau in the country. Fírm audíting ís a 
durnmy varíable which takes on value on íf the firm provide its shareholders wíth annual financíal statements 
that have been reviewed by an extemal auditor, and 0 otherwise. Higher value indicates more information 
disclosure ofthe finn . 8ank concentratíon (Deposit) is the fractíon oftotal deposits held by the five largest banks 
in the industry. 8ank concentration (Asset) is the fraction of total assets held by the five largest banks in the 
industry. Entry barrier measures the entry into banking requirement, which is a variable developed based on 
eight questions regarding whether various types of legal submissíon are required to obtain a bankíng license. The 
index ranges from 0 (Iow entry requirement) to 8 (high entry requirement). Hígher values indicate greater 
stringency. Applícation Denied is the percentage to which applications to enter banking are denied in the past 
tìve years. Private 8ank Ownership indicates of the banking system's assets in the banks that are 50 percent or 
more owned by private investors. Foreign Bank Ownership indicates the share of banks owned by foreígn 
investors. Goverηment is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if any govemment agency or state body has a 
tìnancial stake in the ownership of the firm , 0 otherwise. Foreign is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if any 
foreign cornpany or individual has a tìnancial stake in the ownership ofthe finn. Law enforcement is a fìml Ievel 
survey indicator whích measures the enforceability of court's decision with a higher value indicating better law 
enforcement. Law enforcement ís a firm level survey indicator which measures the faímess and ímpartialness of 
court's d巴cision with a higher va 
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Table 6: Magnitude of the Effects: Competition , J nformation and Corruption 
2 3 4 
Bank Concentration 1 standard dev. increase -0.067 0.006 0.018 0.043 
Change from Minimum to Maximum -0.299 0.025 0.078 0.196 
Application Denied 1 standard dev. increase -0.048 0.004 0.013 0.030 
Change from Minimum to Maximum -0.173 0.002 0.042 0.128 
Entry Barrier 1 standard dev. increase -0.080 0.007 0.022 0.051 
Change from Minimum to Maximum -0.357 0.081 0.104 0.171 
Private Bureau Change from 0 10 1 0.071 0.141 -0.025 -0.041 
Firm Auditing Change from 0 to 1 0.057 0.113 -0.018 -0.033 
Deposit Insurance Change 什om Oto 1 -0.051 -0.101 0.012 0.028 
Govemment Chanεe from 0 to 1 0.059 0.117 -0.019 -0.034 
Foreign Change from 0 to 1 0.028 0.056 -0.007 -0.016 
The estimation is based on model 5 in table 5. Bank concentration is the fraction oftotal deposits held by the five 
Jargest banks in the industry. AppJication Denied is the percentage to which appJications to enter banking are 
denied in the past five years. Entry barrier measures the entry into banking requirement, which is a variabJe 
developed based on eight questions regarding whether various types of Jegal submission are required to obtain a 
banking Jicense. The index ranges from 0 (Jow entry requirement) to 8 (high entry requirement). Higher values 
indicate greater stringency. Private Bureau is a dummy variable which takes on vaJue one if a private credit 
bureau operates in the country by the end of 1999, zero otherwise. Firm auditing is a dummy variabJe which 
takes on value on if the tìrm provid巴 its shareholders with annual financial statements that have been reviewed 
by an extemal auditor, and 0 otherwise. Govemment is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if any govemment 
agency or state body has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm , 0 otherwise. Foreign is a dummy variable 
which equals to 1 if any foreign company or individual has a financial stake in the ownership of the tìrm 
Numbers in column 1, 2, 3, 4, indicate the change in the probability that an average tìrm rates the corruption of 
bank officiaJs as no obstacJe, a minor obstacJe, a moderate obstacJ e and a major obstacle, respectively due to the 
change ofthe bank competition and information variabJe as indicated in the second coJumn 
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Table 7 : Prohi t A na l)海 i s: Compcti t io n. Information a nd Co rruptio n 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Probit Probit Probi t rv Probit rv Probit rv Probit 
Bank Concentration (Asset) 0.936 0.887 2.435 1.324 
[0.047 ]艸 [0.054]* [ 0.000] 料* [0.0 1 7]叫
Bank Concentration (Deposi t) 1. 066 2.395 
[0 . 024]抖 [0.000]*** 
Ent ry Barrier 0.298 0.314 0.249 1. 1 14 1. 174 0.774 
[0.005 ]抖* [0.005 ]抖* [0.007]*** [0.000]料* [0 . 000]*抖 [0.000 ]叫*
Application Denied 0.629 0.699 0.542 2.160 2.60 1 0.983 
[0 . 049]叫 [0.029]抖 [0.058]* [0.0 10]** [0 . 002]艸* [0.009]料*
Pub lic Regist ry 0.030 0.207 
[0.860] [0. 170] 
Private Bureau -0 .359 -0.328 
[0.043]艸 [0 . 023 ]村
Firm Auditing -0.319 -0 .037 
[0.002 ]抖* [0.647] 
Private Bank Ownership -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 -0 .006 
[0.160] [0.221 ] [0.062]* [0.009]*** [0.05 1]* [0.052]* 
Foreign Bank Ownership -0.010 -0 .010 -0.009 -0.0 11 -0.009 -0.0 10 
[0.028]** [0 . 027]抖 [0.031 ]艸 [0.050]* [0.109] [0.035 ]抖
Government -0.3 10 -0.309 -0.312 -0.356 -0.349 -0 .4 17 
[0.002]叫* [0.002 ]抖* [0 . 00 1]抖* [0 . 002 ]抖* [0 . 003 ]料* [0 . 000]叫*
Forei gn -0.200 -0.194 -0. 155 -0. 192 -0.169 -0.246 
[ 0 . 00 1]材* [0.00 1]抖* 10 . 0 1 9]村 [0.021 ]** [0.044]** [0.002]叫*
Competitor 0.05 1 0.050 0.029 0 .1 25 0.128 0. 10 1 
[0 .446] [0.451 ] [0.6 18] [0,028]** [0.027]艸 [0.08 1]* 
Fair Court -0 .044 -0.043 -0.038 0.003 0.009 0.00 1 
[0.0 1 7 ]抖 [0 . 020]抖 [ 0.037]抖 [0.925] [0.788] [0.981 ] 
Law Enforcement -0.086 -0.085 -0.093 -0.037 -0.036 -0.059 
[0. 000]叫* [0.000]叫* [0.000]仲* [0. 135] [0.1 58] [0.019]叫
Firm Size -0.016 -0.016 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.007 
[0.125] [0. 126] [0.585] [0.673] [0.965] [0 .4 10] 
Exporter -0.180 -0.17 1 -0.1 61 -0.119 -0. 11 9 -0.140 
[0 . 001]叫* [0.00 1 ]*艸 [0.006]料* [0.100] [0.106] [0.050]** 
C reditor Rights -0.046 -0.047 “ 0.057 -0 .050 -0.038 -0.074 
[0 .484] [0.468] [0.368] [0. 182] [0.327] [0 . 043 ]抖
Deposit Insurance 0.222 0.25 1 0.258 1.450 1.570 0.982 
[0.101 ] [0.075]* [0 . 028 ]抖 [0 . 000]抖* [0 . 000] *料 [0 . 000]*抖
Bank Accounting Disclosure 0.123 0.107 0.177 0.271 0.154 0.308 
[0 .428] [0.461] [0.202] [0.045]抖 [0.224] [ 0 .021]叫
Other Macro-controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
lndustrγDummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3,489 3,489 3 司 270 2384 2384 2206 
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Bank Corruption DUITImy is the response to the question "Is the corruption of bank offìcials as an obstacle for 
the operation and growth of your business?", where “ no obstacle" is equal to zero and "minor" ,“moderate" and 
“major" is equal to one. Bank concentration (Deposit) is the fraction of total deposits held by Ihe tive largest 
banks in the industry. Bank concentration (Asset) is Ihe fraction of lotal assets held by the tive largest banks in 
the industry. Entry barrier measures the entry into banking requirement, which is a variable developed based on 
eight questions regarding whether various types of legal submission are required to obtain a banking license. The 
index ranges from 0 (Iow entry requirement) to 8 (high entry requirement). Higher values indicate greater 
stringency. Application Denied is the percentage to which applications to enter banking are denied in the past 
five years. Public Credit Registry is a dummy variable which takes on value one if a public credit registry 
operates in the country by the end of 1999, zero otherwise. Private Bureau is a dummy variables which takes on 
value one if a private credit bureau operates in the count可 by the end of 1999, zero otherwise. Firm auditing is a 
dummy variable which takes on value on if the firm provide its shareholders with annual tinancial statements 
that have been reviewed by an extemal auditor, and 0 otherwise. Higher value indicates more information 
disclosure of the tirm. Private Bank Ownership indicates of the banking system這出sets in the banks that are 50 
percent or more owned by private investors. Foreign 8ank Ownership indicates the share of banks owned by 
foreign investors. Govemment is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if any govemment agency or state body 
has a tinancial stake in the ownership of the firm, 0 otherwise. Foreign is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if 
any foreign company or individual has a tinancial stake in the ownership of the tirm. Law enforcement is a tirm 
level survey indicator which measures the enforceability of court ' s decision with a higher value indicating better 
law enforcement. Law enforcement is a tirm level survey indicator which measures the faimess and 
impartialness of cou前' s decision with a higher value indicating more faimess. Firm size is the natural logarithm 
of tinn sales in US$. Exporter is a dummy variable that takes on value one if the tirm is an exporter and zero 
otherwise. Creditor Rights is an index which measur 
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Table 8: Inforrnation , Competition and Corruption witn More Macro Controls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bank Concentration (Deposit) 1.173 0.861 1.05 1 1.07 1.04 
[0 . 002)叫* [0.014)** [0 . 003)叫* [0 . 004)材* [0 . 003)村*
Application Denied 0.565 0.306 0.443 0.453 0.457 
[0.009)抖* [0.230) [0.077)* [0.061)* [0.074]* 
Entry Barrier 0.206 0.233 0.225 0.235 0.231 
[0 . 012)叫 [0 . 003]抖* [0 .010]抖* [0 . 005)抖* [0 . 010]抖*
Public Credit Registry -0.064 -0.007 0.015 0.018 0.014 
[0.691] [0.960] [0.921] [0.908] [0.931] 
Private Bureau -0.398 -0.355 -0.324 -0.358 -0.326 
[0 . 017]叫 [0.036]抖 [0.086]* [0 .045]村 [0.069]* 
Firm Auditing -0.276 -0.278 -0.28 -0.285 -0.282 
[0.001]*叫 [0.000]材* [0.000]叫* [0.000]*** [0.000]叫*
Pri vate Bank Ownership -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0 .003 
[0.117] [0.284] [0.331 ] [0.316] [0.363] 
Foreiεn Bank Ownership -0.011 -0.007 -0 .008 -0.008 -0.008 
[0 . 013]抖 [0.066]* [0 . 031]抖 [0.029]材 [0.03 5]抖
Govemment -0.32 -0.299 -0.297 -0.295 -0.293 
[0 . 001]叫* [0 . 001]抖* [0 .002]抖* [0 . 002]抖* [0 . 002]料*
Foreign 
-0.134 -0.134 -0.142 -0.141 -0.141 
[0.031]抖 [0.027]** [0.021]抖 [0 . 020]村 [0.021]抖
Competitor 0.003 0.019 0.021 0.014 0.022 
[0 .949] [0.719] [0.690] [0.793] [0.690] 
Fair Court 
-0.055 -0.049 -0.047 
-0.052 -0.046 
[0 . 003]抖* [0.011]抖 [0.016]抖 [0.007]抖拿 [0.021]抖
Law Enforcement -0.086 -0.079 -0.082 -0.082 -0.08 
[0.000]*** [0 . 001]抖* [0 . 000]抖* [0 . 000]抖* [0 . 000]抖*
Firm Size 0.007 0.003 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0005 
[0.582] [0.820] [0 .989] [0.986] [0.969] 
Expo付er
-0.188 -0.166 -0.169 -0.177 -0. 165 
[0.000]叫* [0 . 003]叫* [0 . 002]材* [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
Creditor Rights 
-0.068 -0.056 -0.054 -0.049 -0.052 
[0.178] [0.271] [0.319] [0.387] [0.3 34] 
Depos it 1 nsurance 0.276 O 可-呵.).)呵 0.26 0.254 0.271 
[0 .012]叫 [0 . 025]抖 [0.014]叫 [0 . 01 6 ]抖 [0 . 01 2 ]抖
Bank Accounting Disclosure 0.227 0.101 0.127 0.152 0.132 
[0.054]* [0.4 11 ] [0.262] [0. 171] [0.234] 
Democracy 
-0.029 
[0.887] 
Openness 0.007 
[0.106] 
Yoice and Accountability 
-0.225 
[0.086]* 
Govemment Effectiveness 
-0.095 
[0 .420] 
Rule ofLaw 0.008 
Control of Corruption 
[0.930] 
-0.096 
Other Macro-controls 
[0.357] 
ves yes yes yes yes 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes ves 
Observations 3,270 3,270 3,270 3,270 3,270 
45 
8ank corruption is the response to the question "Is the corruption of bank offìcials as an obstacle for the 
operation and growth of your business (I-no obstacle, 2- minor obstacle, 3- a moderate obstacle, 4-major 
obstacle)". 8ank concentration (Deposit) is the fraction of total deposits held by the five largest banks in the 
industrγ8ank concentration (Asset) is the fraction of total assets held by the five largest banks in the industry 
Entry barrier measures the entry into banking requirement, which is a variable developed based on eight 
questions regarding whether various types of legal submission are required to obtain a banking license. The 
index ranges from 0 (Iow entry requirement) to 8 (high entry requirement). Higher values indicate greater 
stringency. Application Denied is the percentage to which applications to enter banking are denied in the past 
five years. Public Credit Registry is a dummy variable which takes on value one if a public credit registry 
operates in the country by the end of 1999, zero otherwise. Private 8ureau is a dummy variables which takes on 
value one if a private credit bureau operates in the countηby the end of 1999‘ zero otherwise. Firrn auditing is a 
dummy variable which takes on value on if the firm provide its shareholders with annual financial statements 
that have been reviewed by an external auditor, and 0 otherwise. Higher value indicates more infonnation 
disclosure of the finn. Private 8ank Ownership indicates of the banking system's assets in the banks that are 50 
percent or more owned by private investors. Foreign 8ank Ownership indicates the share of banks owned by 
foreign investors. Government is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if any govemment agency or state body 
has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm , 0 otherwise. Foreign is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if 
any foreign company or individual has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm. Law enforcement is a finn 
level survey indicator which measures the enforceability of court‘s decision with a higher value indicating better 
law enforcement. Law enforcement is a finn level survey indicator which measures the faimess and 
impartialness of court's decision with a higher va\ue indicating more faimess . Finn size is the natural logarithm 
of firm sales in US$. Exporter is a dummy variable that takes on value one if the firm is an expo叫er and zero 
otherwise. Creditor Rights is an index which measures the power 0 
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